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The Electoral College effectively disenfranchises voters who live outside the few
states that decide presidential elections. This report endorses a change in the
way electoral votes are allocated to ensure that Americans’ votes receive the
same weight. States should sign on to the National Popular Vote Interstate
Compact, an agreement among states to allocate their electoral votes to the
winner of the national popular vote. Ranked choice voting should also be
employed to ensure that candidates receive majority support.
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by
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is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available
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Executive Summary
This report examines ways states can change elector allocation
in the Electoral College to better reflect the popular vote. It
considers four options: (1) direct election; (2) proportional
allocation based on the results of the statewide popular vote
in each state; (3) the congressional district method, which
involves allocation based on the results of the popular vote in
congressional districts; and (4) ranked choice/instant runoff
voting. We recommend direct election implemented via the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an agreement
among states to assign their electoral votes to the winner of the
national popular vote. The NPVIC takes effect when compacting
states have enough electoral votes—270—to choose the
president. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia, which
together hold 196 electoral votes, have joined the compact.
We also recommend instant runoff voting to ensure the winning
candidate obtains a majority of votes. This system requires
voters to rank their preferences when there are more than two
candidates. If no candidate receives a majority of first choice
votes, the votes of the candidate with the fewest first choice
votes are reassigned in a process that repeats until a candidate
wins a majority.
We endorse the NPVIC for several reasons. Proportional
allocation and the congressional district method are both less
effective at improving the electoral vote’s conformance with the
popular vote. They also present many of their own problems.
Proportional allocation of votes according to states’ respective
popular votes requires states to design rules designating
thresholds for obtaining electors—a process that would be
subject to partisan gaming and could threaten the integrity of
the interstate and largely uniform system. Allocating a state’s
electoral votes based on the vote in its congressional districts
creates similar incentives for legislatures to manipulate the
system for partisan advantage, especially by gerrymandering
congressional districts. Both systems are susceptible to
additional problems when there are third party candidates. Such
contests involve increased risk that no candidate will receive a
majority of the electoral votes, which would trigger the highly
problematic contingent election process. In that process, the
House of Representatives is tasked with choosing the president
from the top three candidates. In sum, neither proportional
allocation nor the congressional district method would

ameliorate the popular-electoral vote conformance problem
enough to justify the other problems they would cause.
Given these realities, a direct popular vote is the only effective
method for remedying the Electoral College’s defects. The
rationale behind the advantage that the Electoral College
confers on small states is tenuous. The current system does
little to functionally privilege those states’ interests even
when they are competitive. More importantly, the system is
remarkably effective at disenfranchising broad swaths of the
American electorate, especially voters who live outside of
battleground states and those who are members of in-state
political minorities. Implementing a direct national vote ensures
that every vote is equal and incentivizes candidates to compete
for votes in big and small communities across the country.
Furthermore, it affirms the fundamental notion that the popular
vote decides who wins and uses an election system familiar to
every American.
The NPVIC is the most workable means to reform the Electoral
College outside of the amending the Constitution, which is
made impractical by the requirements for approval in twothirds of both houses of Congress and in three-fourths of state
legislatures. State-by-state allocation changes are unrealistic
because any single state loses power in the Electoral College by
switching away from winner-takes-all to either the district or
proportional systems. There are also still considerable questions
about whether the NPVIC is constitutional, with or without
congressional approval. This report does not seek to answer
those questions; even if it faces credible court challenges, it
is still a powerful political mechanism to spur other reform
measures.
Finally, we advocate for instant runoff, or ranked choice, voting
because a first-past-the-post direct national election introduces
too great a possibility of a candidate winning the presidency
with less than a majority of the popular vote. One benefit of the
Electoral College system is that it forces the winner to obtain a
majority (of electors or state House delegations), manifesting
the importance of a true governing mandate. Accordingly,
we believe a direct national election should go to an instant
runoff via a ranked-choice voting procedure if no candidate has
obtained a majority of the popular vote.
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Introduction: An Executive Accountable to the People
The Electoral College is a unique system of voting: no other
democracy chooses its executive in the same manner, nor does
any U.S. state use such a system to elect its governor.1 This
complicated system reflects an attempt by the Constitution’s
framers to balance competing desires for an executive who
would be independent of Congress and insulated from the
pressure of a potentially ill-informed public.2 But the Electoral
College system as it currently functions is not what the framers
envisioned. Beginning with the nation’s earliest elections, the
system evolved in response to demands for more representative
government.3 In modern elections, the statewide popular vote
is used in all but two states to determine how electors will
cast their votes for president.4 In 48 states and the District of
Columbia, all electors are awarded to the plurality winner of the
vote in a system more commonly known as winner-takes-all.5
Two states allocate electors according to the outcome the vote
in their congressional districts.6

1

Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem
of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 906 (2017).

2

Brandon H. Robb, Making the Electoral College Work Today: The Agreement
Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L.
REV. 419, 426-27 (2008).
Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the
Electoral College, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124-25 (2001).

3
4

Id. at 2126.

5

U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS
ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.
html (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).

6

JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE xxxvi (4th ed. 2013).
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The use of the popular vote at the state and district level has
not always resulted in the winner of the national popular vote
capturing the presidency. In two of the last five presidential
elections, closely-contested races were awarded to the loser
of the national popular vote due to narrow statewide popular
victories leading to an electoral majority.7 The candidate who
won the most popular votes across the nation has lost in a total
of five elections.8
The key question today is whether the system can remain
legitimate in the eyes of the American people. Moreover, voters
in solidly blue and red states who prefer candidates from a
different party now are “effectively disenfranchised.”9
These problems are a fundamental threat to the system’s
efficacy that demand immediate reform. In its first Part, this
report addresses the Electoral College system’s evolution from
a deliberative check on the public to a mere mathematical quirk
in voting. The second Part addresses the system’s advantages
and disadvantages by examining the five times it failed to
select the winner of the national popular vote. The third Part
examines four proposals for reform. The final Part advocates for
coordinated state action to allow voters to select the president
through a national popular vote.
7

Katherine Florey, Losing Bargain: Why Winner-Take-All Vote Assignment is
the Electoral College’s Least Defensible Feature, 68 CASE W. RES. 317, 346-47
(2017).

8

Jose A. Del Real & Julie Turkewitz, Should the Electoral College Be Eliminated?
15 States Are Trying to Make it Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/electoral-college.html.

9

See KOZA, supra note 6, at 11.

I. A Brief History of Electing the President
This Part discusses the Electoral College’s development at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787. It then discusses how the
Electoral College quickly evolved to become more democratic.
The final section of this Part provides an overview of some of
the major attempts to reform the Electoral College.

A. The Convention Plan for a
Deliberative Body
The Electoral College was a compromise created after
competing coalitions at the Constitutional Convention could
not agree on whether to select the executive through direct
national election, legislative appointment, or some combination
of the two. Many of the framers believed appointment by the
legislature would make the president beholden to lawmakers.10
The other main option—direct popular election—would be
more democratic, but some delegates had concerns that an
ill-informed public could be swayed to install a demagogue.11
This conflict of values was highly factional, with small states
and southern states banding together against direct election.12
Small states feared direct election would diminish their voting
power, while the southern states wanted the same power
they secured in legislative apportionment via the Three-Fifths
Clause to count in executive selection.13 The clause provided
that three-fifths of the slaves in southern states would be
counted toward the states’ population size in determining
how many representatives they would have in the House of
Representatives.14 The number of electors each state would
receive in the Electoral College would be determined by the
respective sizes of states’ combined representation in the
House and Senate.15
The delegates passed the issue to a subcommittee after
several contradicting votes.16 Seeking to resolve the impasse,
it recommended a body convened every four years through
separate proceedings in each state to select the president called

the Electoral College.17 States would select the members of
this group to deliberate on candidates for the presidency and
choose the one who would best serve the nation.18 The proposal
conceded to the smaller and southern states outsized voting
power, while still making the national executive accountable
to the whole nation. Delegates left satisfied they had created a
legitimate and fair process that would choose highly competent
leaders who were invested in the Republic.19

B. Partisanship and Popular Demand
Hijack The System
The states were empowered to determine how their respective
electors would be chosen.20 Courts have held that this power is
unqualified;21 the only constitutional restriction is that an elector
may not be a “Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”22 For some
time, the flexibility provided to states resulted in a patchwork of
processes across the country.23 The Electoral College’s evolution
into the consistent system we know today reflects the demands
of popular and partisan politics, manifested in several critical
shifts in the nation’s early history.
The first such shift occurred in 1796.24 In the first two
presidential elections, in 1788 and 1792, electors had carefully
deliberated as the framers envisioned, but this did not
occur during the nation’s first competitive election between
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans.25 Both parties in the
1796 election left nothing to chance, and only chose electors in
the states they controlled who would commit to voting for their
party’s candidate.26 The winner, Federalist John Adams, secured
a majority by a three-vote margin with all but one elector voting
for their party’s candidate.27 This election marked the beginning
of electors serving a ministerial function of casting votes as
instructed, instead of engaging in deliberation.28
17 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2116.

10 John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1968).

18 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 79-80.

11

20 Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and
Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 967 (2016).

ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR
PRESERVING FEDERALISM 48 (1994).

12 See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an
Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 41 (1986)
(discussing small state interests in avoiding a national popular election).
13 See id. See also GEORGE C. EDWARDS, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR
AMERICA 87 (2004) (discussing southern states’ desires to retain ThreeFifths Compromise in executive selection).
14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
16 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 79-80 (stating that the issue was referred to
the Committee of Eleven).

19 See Slonim, supra note 12, at 36.

21 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000).
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 969.
23 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 74.
24 See id. at 75.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 76.
28 See id. at 78 (“Since 1796, the Electoral College has had the form, but not
the substance, of the deliberative body envisioned by the Founders.”).
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The Electoral College’s evolution continued with the 12th
Amendment, which was prompted by the election of 1800.29
In that contest, Democratic-Republican candidate Thomas
Jefferson received 73 electoral votes to incumbent John Adams’
65.30 Yet Jefferson did not win the presidency outright.31 His
party had failed to correctly account for the Electoral College’s
rules when it instructed electors on how to vote.32 Under the
Electoral College’s original rules, the candidate who received
a majority of electoral votes would be president and the
candidate who received the second most votes would be vice
president.33 Due to the Democratic-Republicans’ oversight,
Jefferson’s running mate, Aaron Burr, received the same
number of electoral votes as Jefferson.34 A tie between two
candidates required the House of Representatives to choose the
president.35 After 35 ballots, Jefferson ultimately prevailed.36
Seeking to avoid a repeat of the 1800 election, Congress
approved the 12th Amendment to require that electors
cast separate ballots for president and vice president.37 The
amendment was ratified in September 1804, in time for that
year’s presidential election.38
The next shift in the Electoral College’s functioning was the
move away from selection of electors by state legislatures. Over
the nation’s first decades, states used several different methods
for choosing electors. The most common methods were
appointment by legislatures, statewide and district popular
voting, or some combination of those methods.39 A trend
toward statewide popular vote steadily emerged, and by 1832
all but one state chose electors by popular vote.40
State legislatures also realized they could maximize electoral
votes for their preferred candidate by using a “unit rule,” or
winner-takes-all system.41 States had strong incentives to
switch to this rule: maximizing the winner’s votes put more
pressure on candidates to compete there, and other states
switching to winner-takes-all only reduced a state’s relative
29 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.

power if it did not switch too.42 In the 1832 election, all of
the states that appointed electors through the popular vote
used the winner-takes-all system.43 This dynamic still looms
for states considering a switch away from winner-takes-all
systems.

C. Reform Attempts Fail to End
Winner-Takes-All
Three periods in American history provide especially strong
examples of the flaws in the Electoral College system. The
elections that took place in two of these periods ignited debate
about reforming or abolishing the Electoral College.
The first period immediately followed the 1876 presidential
election, the second election in which the popular vote winner
did not obtain an electoral vote majority.44 Democrats made
allegations of fraud in key southern states where the Republican
candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, purportedly won narrow popular
victories.45 With no clear winner of the majority of electoral
votes, the House of Representatives could have chosen the
president.46 Instead, both parties in Congress decided to create
a commission to resolve the conflict over the disputed electoral
votes. Hayes ultimately prevailed following a key party-line vote
by the commission.47 The moment highlighted how partisan
conflict and obscure procedures could lead either candidate
to victory in a close race. Twelve years later, a Democrat again
lost the Electoral College after winning the popular vote.48 The
dysfunction of the 1876 election gave proponents of Electoral
College reform a compelling example of some of the flaws in the
system that they have continued to cite.49
The second moment occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s.
The 1968 election was a key event in this period that added
significant momentum to the push for reform. In that
race, Alabama Governor George Wallace ran a third-party
candidacy focused on winning enough electoral votes to
deny one of the major party candidates—Richard Nixon and
Hubert Humphrey—enough votes to win an Electoral College

30 See id. at 975.
31 Id.
32 See id.

42 See Michael J. O’Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2427 (1992).

33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3.

43 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2125.

34 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 975.

44 See Robb, supra note 2, at 441-42.

35 See id.

45 See id.

36 See id. at 976.

46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.

37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.

47 See id.

38 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.

48 See id. at 442-43.

39 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2124.

49 See, e.g., KOZA, supra note 6, at 126-27; ABA COMM’N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE
REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 31-32 (1967).

40 Id. at 2125.
41 See id. at 2124-25.
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majority.50 Wallace wanted to bargain his electoral votes in
exchange for policy concessions from Nixon or Humphrey.51
He ultimately won 45 electoral votes by winning five southern
states, but Nixon did not need those votes to capture the
presidency.52 Still, the election was close53 and Wallace’s
strategy highlighted vulnerabilities in the system that many
believed justified broad reform.
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana championed the most prominent
reform plan—a constitutional amendment providing for direct
popular election.54 Under his proposal, a plurality winner
receiving 40 percent or more of the national popular vote would
become president. If no candidate reached that threshold, the
top two vote-getting candidates would proceed to a runoff.55
The American Bar Association promoted a direct election
amendment with the same runoff threshold during this period.56
The Bayh proposal won a required two-thirds vote in the House
in 1969, but progress stalled when it reached the Senate.57
As the chamber considered the amendment, a coalition of
southern senators concerned with states’ rights and smallstate conservatives emerged to filibuster the amendment.58
Yet reform regained some momentum after the 1976 election,
which saw Jimmy Carter narrowly avoid defeat in the Electoral
College despite exceeding Gerald Ford in the popular vote
count by more than 1.5 million.59 A “shift of 3,687 popular votes
in Hawaii and 5,559 popular votes in Ohio” would have cost
Carter the presidency.60 Bayh’s proposal received a final vote in
the Senate in 1979, when it garnered majority support but not
the required two-thirds.61 Although unsuccessful, the reform
effort of the 1960s and 1970s was the closest the nation has
come in modern times to implementing popular election.62

Renewed enthusiasm for Electoral College reform followed the
two recent popular-electoral splits in 2000 and 2016.63 The
close national popular vote margins between the two major
party candidates in recent presidential elections increases the
likelihood of popular-electoral vote splits.64 The margins have
also been close in many key states, and several large states
have increasingly awarded their electoral votes to candidates
winning the statewide vote by less than two percent. In 2016,
the margin was less than two percent in five states with more
than ten electoral votes.65
The 2000 election inspired a new approach to reform that
received fresh interest following the 2016 election. Instead
of attempting the politically difficult option of amending the
Constitution, many reformers have turned their attention to
changes to the way states allocate electors. The National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact (“NPVIC”) has been the most
novel and successful of these efforts.
The NPVIC is an agreement among states to award their
electors to the winner of the national popular vote, but only
once the enacting states hold a majority of the electoral votes.66
The plan was initially advocated in 2001 by Robert Bennett,67
and later elaborated on by Akhil and Vikram Amar.68 An
organization called National Popular Vote Inc. was founded in
2006 to draft template NPVIC legislation and advocate for its
passage in legislatures across the country.69
Though appealing in its simplicity, the compact stalled out
after some success in heavily Democratic states through the
late 2000s and early 2010s.70 However, the 2016 election
helped lead to the NPVIC’s adoption in Connecticut in 2018 and

51 Id.

63 Jillian Robbins, Changing the System Without Changing the System: How the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Would Leave Non-Compacting States
Without A Leg to Stand On, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 9 (2017).

52 Id.

64 See Florey, supra note 7, at 344.

53 Id.

65 Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.

50 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 127.

54 See John R. Bohrer, Birch Bayh’s Long War On The Electoral College, BUZZFEED
(Nov. 6, 2012, 1:39 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
johnrbohrer/birch-bayhs-long-war-on-the-electoral-college.
55 Florey, supra note 7, at 381.
56 See ABA COMM’N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, supra note 49.
57 See Florey, supra note 7, at 381.
58 See id. at 382.
59 KOZA, supra note 6, at 128.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See Florey, supra note 7, at 318.

66 Dennis A. Lienhardt, Jr., The Electoral College: An Analysis of Reform Proposals
Through the Lens of Past Presidential Elections, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 439, 447
(2016).
67 See Robert Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without A Constitutional
Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 241 (2001).
68 See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National
Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution: Part Three of a
Three-Part Series on the 2000 Election and the Electoral College., FINDLAW: U.S.
SUPREME COURT CTR. (Dec. 28, 2001), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legalcommentary/how-to-achieve-direct-national-election-of-the-presidentwithout-amending-the-constitution.html.
69 Tim Alberta, Is the Electoral College Doomed?, POLITICO MAG. (Sept./Oct.
2007), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/electoralcollege-national-popular-vote-compact-215541.
70 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 282-91.
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Colorado, Delaware, New Mexico, and Oregon in 2019.71 The
compact covers states and the District of Columbia comprising
196 electoral votes so far.72 Significantly, states have only
enacted the NPVIC when Democrats have had unified control
of their government.73 It may also face constitutional challenges,
and courts would likely need to resolve lawsuits challenging the
compact before it would ever go into effect.74

D. The Electoral College Today:
A Brief Review
There are currently 538 electoral votes in the Electoral
College.75 Each state has electors equal to its total number
of representatives in Congress, and the District of Columbia
has three electors pursuant to the 23rd Amendment.76 A
presidential candidate must receive a majority of 270 electoral
votes to win. If no candidate receives a majority of electoral
votes, the House of Representatives elects the president in a
71 National Popular Vote, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/national-popular-vote.aspx (last
visited June 26, 2019).
72 Caroline Kelly, Oregon governor signs bill granting state’s electoral votes
to national popular vote winner, CNN (June 12, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/politics/oregon-joins-national-popular-votecompact/index.html.
73 Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://
www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited June 17, 2019).
74 See, e.g., David Gringer, Why the National Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong way
to Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2008); Robb, supra
note 2, at 419; see generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
75 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 965.
76 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; US CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
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contingent election where each state delegation has one vote
and a candidate must receive a majority to become president.77
There are currently two schemes in the US for choosing
electors: 48 states and the District of Columbia use the
winner-takes-all-method, while Maine and Nebraska use the
congressional district method.78 Most states empower political
parties to choose a slate of electors, and allow voters to select
a slate that will vote for the party’s candidate.79 In winnertakes-all states (as well as DC), the slate that receives at least
a plurality of the votes cast is elected.80 In Maine and Nebraska,
the popular vote winner state-wide is awarded two electors,
and the winning candidate in each congressional district is
awarded one.81 Even in this system, votes for candidates who
do not obtain a plurality on a state or district level are not
represented in the electoral vote count.82
77 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The person having the greatest number of
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority
of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose
shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and
a majority of all states shall be necessary to a choice.”); see also Nicholas
G. Karambelas, The Electoral College and the Race to 270, 72 J. MO. B. 260
(2016).
78 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 989; see Karambelas, supra note 77, at 261.
79 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 969.
80 See id. at 966; see also Karambelas, supra note 77, at 261.
81 See id.
82 Alexander S. Belenky, District Vote Proposals Fall Short, BALT. SUN (Dec.
11, 2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2007-12-110712110033-story.html.

II. Why Reform Is Necessary
This Part addresses arguments for retaining the Electoral
College, specifically those made on practical, historical and
political grounds. It concludes by arguing that benefits the
Electoral College may have provided in the past are no longer
present and that it is not justifiable to continue using the system
to select the president.

A. The Practical Argument
Proponents note that the Electoral College makes election
administration easier. They argue that limiting a campaign’s
geographic scope to battlegrounds helps candidates keep costs
down and makes lower-budget candidacies possible.83 They
also argue that the Electoral College lessens voter fraud and
tabulation error because every vote’s impact is limited to the
state where it is cast.84 Finally, proponents believe the system
decreases the chance that a third-party candidate will earn
electoral votes, which helps winning candidates secure a higher
vote percentage.85 Presidents elected with a smaller plurality
“would only aggravate the sense that the executive branch
governs without a real electoral mandate.”86
Some of these points are thinly reasoned. For instance, vote
manipulation’s “limited impact” in the Electoral College is
still large enough that many state legislatures passed voter
suppression measures through the 2010s.87 These measures
were arguably effective at flipping several states in the 2016
election and, ultimately, the result itself, even though their
impacts were technically limited to only in-state vote totals.88
The Electoral College only discourages manipulation in states
where one party has a strong advantage. It incentivizes
manipulation in competitive states.
However, even those more salient points troublingly presuppose
that concerns regarding popular will should give way to “making
elections easier.” The answer to the difficulties of democracy
should not be to rein in democracy; rather, it should be make
those difficulties easier to manage. Moreover, the argument
that the Electoral College is an “easy to administer” system is
tenuous: it is mathematically more complex than a direct vote
and creates deeply perverse incentives for our institutions.

B. The Historical Argument
The Electoral College is the only method in the Constitution
for electing the president; the founding document says nothing
about the popular vote.89 As illustrated in Part I, the framers
final compromise was meant to embody two key values of the
competing factions: extra voting power for small and southern
states and careful deliberation by a representative body.90
Notions of federalism were also at play—state legislatures’
ultimate control of elector allocation made the states the key
players in selecting an executive.91 Proponents argue that these
values should weigh heavily in any proposed reform.92
However, the framers’ design for executive selection may
not have much merit when examined in the modern era. The
compromise with small and southern states on voting power
was less a reasoned bargain than it was an acquiescence to
keep the Convention together and avoid additional conflict.93
This suggests the Electoral College, while necessary at the
time, may not have been the preferred system of a majority
of delegates nor upheld values they felt were particularly
important.94 Furthermore, this agreement effectively extended
the Three-Fifths Compromise to executive selection.95 Needless
to say, concessions meant to preserve slavery and its vestiges
must be viewed as extremely suspect.96
Moreover, the Electoral College’s successful history of
facilitating transfers of power glosses over underlying issues.
While most elections have ended with an electoral majority,
those that have not were resolved by contingent elections.97
89 See Guelzo, supra note 84, at 66-67 (“While it is true that, since the 19th
century, each state has decided to appoint it electors by a popular vote,
this is a compliment to our democratic predilections and is not required
by the Constitution. And it should be noted that popular votes for electors
occur only within each state; the electors then go on to do the presidential
balloting.”).
90 See supra Part I.
91 See generally Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1251-54 (2012).
92 See, e.g., Tara Ross, The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/
the-electoral-college-enlightened-democracy.
93 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 87.

83 See Jack Rakove & Michael W. McConnell, Should We Abolish the Electoral
College?, STANFORD MAG. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://stanfordmag.org/contents/
should-we-abolish-the-electoral-college.
84 Allen C. Guelzo, In Defense of the Electoral College, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Winter
2018, at 75-76.
85 See id. at 76.
86 See id.
87 See, e.g., Ari Berman, Rigged: How Voter Suppression Threw Wisconsin to
Trump, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2017/10/voter-suppression-wisconsin-election-2016.

94 See id. (“As early as June 2, James Wilson had suggested, as a possible
compromise, an intermediate election plan involving an electoral college,
and during the summer this alternative developed as ‘the second choice of
many delegates though it was the first choice of few.’”).
95 See supra Part I.
96 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/opinion/theelectoral-college-unfair-from-day-one.html.
97 See Karambelas, supra note 77, at 262.

88 See id.
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Two presidential elections have been decided this way, in 1800
and 1824.98 Today, a contingent election would fundamentally
threaten the broader system’s efficacy and legitimacy,
creating the potential for undue delay, and perceived or actual
corruption, and a selection unrelated to the will of voters.99
Such potential suggests a manifest need for reform and a
broader notion that the system the framers designed is not as
sacrosanct as some may deem it.

C. The Political Argument
Proponents of the Electoral College also believe that its
unequal voting power is good for the representativeness of
the system.100 They claim it forces candidates to appeal to the
interests of rural voters in competitive states instead of only
focusing on densely populated parts of the country.101 Moreover,
proponents believe the battleground state focus incentivizes
greater candidate moderation and outreach to a constituency
broader than a candidate’s most ardent supporters.102 A
candidate cannot win the presidency by simply running up
huge margins in a certain area of the country—victory requires
substantial support in multiple distinct locations.103 Finally,
proponents argue presidents with popular mandates can be
dangerous.104 Majoritarian politics can produce demagoguery,
and the Electoral College checks the president from asserting
a popular mandate to trammel the government’s other
branches.105
There are some fundamental problems with this framing.
For one, the battleground states candidates focus on are
not necessarily states with large moderate populations.106
Even in competitive states, candidates’ best strategies may
involve appealing to partisan voters, instead of moderates, to
98 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 975-77.
99 Rami Fakhouri, The Most Dangerous Blot In Our Constitution: Retiring the
Flawed Electoral College ‘Contingent Procedure’, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 715
(2010). In the election of 1824, Jackson won the popular vote and received
the most electoral votes, but lost the contingency election. See Goldfeder,
supra note 20, at 977.
100 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 45-46.
101 See Guelzo, supra note 84, at 75-76.
102 Geoffrey Calderaro, Promoting Democracy While Preserving Federalism: The
Electoral College, the National Popular Vote, and the Federal District Popular
Vote Allocation Alternative, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 287, 305 (2013).
103 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of the Electoral College, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2012,
11:57 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/11/defending-theelectoral-college.html; see also Craig J. Herbst, Redrawing the Electoral Map:
Reforming the Electoral College with the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV.
217, 227-28 (2012).
104 Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 533 (1994).
105 See generally Guelzo, supra note 84, at 77.
106 See Florey, supra note 7, at 371-73.
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ensure they turn out to vote.107 Additionally, though traditional
television and radio advertising has greater effect in denser
locales, modern campaign strategy has trended toward voter
targeting that weighs demographic and psychographic variables
more heavily than geography.108 Without the Electoral College,
campaigns would still focus on targeting individual voters. It
is far from clear that campaigns would only focus on densely
populated areas. Still, there is more merit to these arguments
than the others put forth by Electoral College advocates. They
are answerable by the following two contentions.

D. The Case for Reform
First, there is reason to believe the Electoral College no longer
has the moderating impact on politics it once did. American
presidential elections have become increasingly partisan, with
candidates focusing on turning out partisan voters, even in
competitive states.109 There is significant evidence that because
battleground states control elections, voters in a majority of
the states are “effectively disenfranchised,”110 depressing voter
turnout in non-battleground states.111 Such a dynamic demands
asking which voters are being left out of the process, and
whether the Electoral College actually contributes to the hyperpartisan dynamic by deterring voters who would help mediate
it.
Additionally, there is not a clear imperative for treating some
voters differently than others. There may be some systemic
benefit to elevating rural and small-state voters through the
Electoral College, but that benefit does not clearly offset the
cost of distorting the result of a popular election.112 The Electoral
College effectively uses electors to multiply certain states’ vote
totals by a coefficient. One might ask those who support this
feature whether voters would ever approve, or politicians could
ever defend, a popular vote system that multiplied some voters’
votes at the expense of others.
107 See id.
108 Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting:
Promises and Threats for Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L.R. 82, 85 (2018).
109 See generally Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative
Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41
ELECTORAL STUDIES 12 (2016).
110 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 11.
111 See id. at 37.
112 Even when a presidential candidate wins both the popular vote and the
Electoral College, the margin of victory in the Electoral College is usually
greater than the margin of victory in the popular vote. Drew Desilver,
Trump’s Victory Another Example of How Electoral College Wins Are Bigger
Than Popular Vote Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslidesare-easier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/.

III. Proposals for Reform
We no longer live in the era of the framers—over 200 years
of history and constitutional development separate us from
the 1787 Convention. Over the nation’s history, a notion of an
inalienable and equal right to vote developed as one of the
most fundamental elements of American democracy.113 As this
notion has taken root, several vestiges of indirect democracy
have fallen to the wayside through progressive-minded reform,
like the indirect election of senators.114 It is not revolutionary
to claim that the Electoral College should do the same—it is
merely the natural endpoint of such a political and cultural shift.
However, we recognize that reform will be difficult. A
constitutional amendment to abolish the Electoral College
proved unachievable during the most sustained reform effort
to date in the mid-20th century and would be only more
challenging today.115 Accordingly, this Part examines a set of
proposals discussed in existing literature for reforming the
Electoral College through the state legislatures. We considered
the specifics of what such a reform would look like and the
impact it would have on the system.

A. Direct National Election
The reform squarely addressed to the Electoral College’s
deficiencies is abandoning it in favor of a direct national popular
vote. Recent polls indicate a majority of Americans support it,
and several presidential candidates for the 2020 election have
endorsed it.116 In the vast majority of democracies where the
head of state and head of government is a combined office, the
position is filled by direct election by the national populace.117
That it is not the case in the United States even after intense
advocacy is a testament to the procedural and sociological
barriers to moving to direct election.

1. Methodology
The methodology of direct popular election is quite simple
from a descriptive standpoint—all votes nationwide for the
113 See Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2530 (2001).
114 Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections
by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote
Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 237-38 (2011).
115 See supra Part I.C; Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 459.
116 Miles Parks, Abolishing the Electoral College Would be More Complicated
Than it May Seem, NPR (Mar. 22, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://www.npr.
org/2019/03/22/705627996/abolishing-the-electoral-college-would-bemore-complicated-than-it-may-seem.
117 Drew Desilver, Among Democracies, U.S. Stands Out in How it Chooses its
Head of State, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2016/11/22/among-democracies-u-s-stands-out-in-how-itchooses-its-head-of-state/.

presidency are totaled, and the candidate with the most
votes wins the presidency. There are practical challenges
of implementing direct election because it would require
either a constitutional amendment or implementation of the
NPVIC. Both avenues are challenging, but the constitutional
amendment route is the hardest to achieve. Additionally,
there are several issues related to calculating the vote total
and setting a threshold for victory in races with more than two
candidates.
First, states would have to standardize elections so votes could
be totaled on a national basis.118 They would either need to
adopt similar voting procedures or have systems adaptable
to the needs of a national vote count.119 Maine, for instance,
recently adopted ranked choice voting for its elections.120
Accordingly, there would need to be clarity on whether firstchoice Maine votes are counted, or whether Maine only sends
votes for president after a candidate has secured a statewide
majority. State requirements for ballot placement, writein candidacies and ballot-counting would raise additional
procedural and standardization concerns.121
Questions would also emerge about substantive differences
in state election conduct. A state that provides an inadequate
number of polling places or poorly designs its ballots, for
instance, would have collateral impacts on the total popular
vote that implicate the interests of other states.122 This conflict
area could create the need for greater standardization across
state elections, perhaps requiring a separate and universal
presidential ballot and polling system.123
Additionally, a threshold would be needed for a candidate
to win the election by national popular vote. A majority is an
intuitive and desirable choice, but it may not be feasible given
the realities of direct elections. The winner-takes-all system of
awarding electoral votes virtually ensures the electoral majority
that the Electoral College requires to avoid a contingent election
in Congress, but a popular vote majority is much less common:
no candidate achieved it in seven of the 18 presidential elections
since World War II, and four of those seven elections have
118 Anthony J. Gaughan, Ramshackle Federalism: America’s Archaic and
Dysfunctional Presidential Election System, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1021, 1038-39
(2016).
119 See id.
120 See Lawrence Lessig, Ranked-choice voting worked in Maine. Now we should
use it in presidential races., USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/16/ranked-choice-voting-maineprotest-candidates-election-2018-column/2023574002/.
121 See Gaughan, supra note 118, at 1038-39.
122 See id. at 1041.
123 See id.
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occurred since 1990.124 In most cases, there was no major
third-party candidate.125 A direct popular vote system would
make third-party candidates more common because fewer
candidates would decide not to run out concern they would be
“spoilers” who would prevent one of the major party candidates
from winning an electoral vote majority.126
The system could still require a popular vote majority and use a
runoff election if no candidate secures one outright. It could also
identify a plurality threshold for victory. The Bayh Amendment
to abolish the Electoral College set such a threshold at 40
percent.127 This would reduce the odds that no candidate would
secure victory, which would be a real possibility if candidates
were required to win a majority. No president has failed to win
at least 40 percent of the popular vote since the election of
1860.128 Still, it would be necessary to include a runoff provision
if there were a victory threshold, and there would be important
questions about how it would work, including when a runoff
would occur, how states would conduct it, who would be eligible
to vote in it, and whether states where a candidate already
received a majority would participate.
If a direct popular election were conducted without a runoff, it
would create the possibility of a candidate receiving a very low
vote share and winning the presidency in a highly contentious
multi-candidate race.129 A popular mandate is important to
effective governance, so some threshold may be cumbersome
but more desirable.130

2. Advantages
The most important advantage of a direct national popular vote
is its most well-known feature: it selects a winner with the most
legitimate claim to a popular mandate. Equalizing the voting
power of every citizen means the candidate with the most
popular support wins the election every time.131 This is the only
electoral system that guarantees such an outcome. Putting the
vote directly to the people does away with the need to allocate
electoral votes by geography and population, a process that is
impossible to design without privileging some voters.
124 United States Presidential Elections, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/United-States-Presidential-Election-Results-1788863 (last
visited Apr. 23, 2019).
125 See id.

Privilege currently permeates our presidential voting
system. As discussed in Part II, small-state voters get a
boost from overrepresentation, and “swing states” attract
significantly more campaign investment in the winner-takesall environment.132 This leaves vast swaths of the American
electorate undervalued in campaigning and governance
because candidates do not view many states’ votes as valuable
or obtainable.133
Even in competitive states, winner-takes-all renders voters
for a losing candidate unrepresented in the final tabulation,
effectively disenfranchising them.134 This feature contributes to
actual and perceived political polarization: blue state Democrats
and red state Republicans are better represented by candidates,
leading the public and political system to perceive those states
as partisan monoliths.135 In an era of increasing partisanship,
this may be the feature of the Electoral College that most
diminishes moderate voices and contributes to a sense of
us-versus-them.136 A national popular vote eliminates these
distorting effects and fosters a more nuanced understanding of
the nation’s political geography.
One key question is whether state legislatures would exercise
greater or lesser control over elections in a national direct vote.
On the one hand, legislatures would no longer decide how
their state’s presidential vote is tabulated. On the other, they
would retain control over voting and could implement measures
that turn out their party’s voters at the expense of the other.137
Whereas only swing state legislatures have an incentive to
manipulate voting in the Electoral College, every state’s votes
would matter in a direct vote.138 However, that same feature
might serve to dampen or mitigate an individual legislature’s
incentives in a national vote: for instance, whereas voting
measures in Florida today could tip the state’s 29 electoral votes
(10.7% of the total) to a given candidate, such measures would
have a narrower impact on the total nationwide popular vote.
132 See supra Part II; Florey, supra note 7, at 352-53.
133 See id.
134 See Florey, supra note 7, at 354. During the 1970s effort in Congress
to abolish the Electoral College, southern Senator Strom Thurmond
staunchly opposed eliminating the Electoral College but called for an end
to the winner-takes-all system. He proposed proportional allocation of
electoral votes to allow for better representation of voters who supported a
candidate who lost their state. See S. REP. NO. 96-111, at 71 (1979).

126 See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present,
and Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 474-75 (2007).

135 Abraham M. Rutchick et al., Seeing Red (and Blue): Effects of Electoral College
Depictions on Political Group Perception, 9 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y
269 (2009).

127 Florey, supra note 7, at 381.

136 See id. at 270-71.

128 Robb, supra note 2, at 461.
129 See id. at 460.

137 See Robb, supra note 2, at 459-60 (discussing the related issue of whether
direct popular election would encourage voter fraud).

130 See generally id.

138 See id.

131 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 449.
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A national direct vote is also very simple, both to administer
and to explain to the public.139 Beyond being intuitive, it is the
system that Americans are familiar with for nearly every other
elected office.140 It also compels greater voter participation, both
because of its simplicity and because of the re-enfranchising
impacts mentioned at length above.141 These changes would
improve public confidence and the legitimacy of elections.

3. Disadvantages
The Electoral College has chosen the president for over 200
years and has utilized winner-takes-all in every state for roughly
the same time.142 Switching to national popular vote would
be a dramatic shift in an otherwise stable process, which
popular vote critics believe is a deeply undervalued feature of
the system.143 Election rules should remain as consistent as
possible to avoid partisan gaming of the system, and the weight
of precedent arguably makes legislatures more deferential to
the winner-takes-all system even where changes to it could
benefit their party.144 One dramatic shift in the system could
precipitate others that are less politically neutral, which would
more substantively threaten legitimate American elections than
the Electoral College’s current defects.145 This is even more the
case if a switch to the national vote is perceived to favor one
party over another.146
Even with all of its attendant benefits, any change this sweeping
would also carry substantial adjustment costs. Parties
would reformulate their presidential selection strategies and
candidates would change their campaigning strategies.147
Federal and state election authorities would need to coordinate
to a greater degree and develop protocols for the country’s only
nationwide popular election.148 The public and the media would
need to re-orient around new conceptions of the electorate and
139 Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
140 Rhonda D. Hooks, Has the Electoral College Outlived Its’ Stay?, 26 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 205 (2001).
141 See Robb, supra note 2, at 459.
142 Herbst, supra note 103, at 228-29.
143 See id.
144 See Michael McLaughlin, Direct Democracy and the Electoral College: Can a
Popular Initiative Change How a State Appoints its Electors?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2943, 2994 (2008).
145 Bruce Ledewitz, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law, 49
AKRON L. REV. 115, 170-71 (2016).
146 Matthew Sheffield, Poll: Democrats Want to Abolish Electoral College,
Republicans Want to Keep It, HILL (Mar. 26, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/
what-americas-thinking/435816-poll-republicans-support-electoralcollege-while-democrats-want.
147 Roberta A. Yard, American Democracy and Minority Rule: How the United
States can Reform its Electoral Process to Ensure “One Person, One Vote.”, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185, 210 (2001).
148 See Gaughan, supra note 118.

strategic voting in the primary and general election.149 Everyone
in the system would need to adjust to delayed election results,
as certain states spend days after Election Day certifying a final
tabulation and litigation threatens final vote counts.150 None of
these adjustments are necessarily bad, but they highlight that a
switch will have short-term financial, social, and political costs.
Finally, Electoral College advocates fear that presidential
candidates will ignore small-state interests when campaigning
and enacting policy in a direct vote system.151 But this argument
is unconvincing for two reasons. First, presidential races in the
modern era are exceedingly close, and votes from both small
and large constituencies could be sufficient to throw a race to
one of the candidates.152 Second, campaigns today target their
efforts based on demographic and psychographic features
more than geography. In a direct vote system, where voters
were located would not matter to campaigns.153 Perhaps more
relevant to these advocates is a potential disadvantage to
dispersed voters—economizing limited campaign resources
may require focusing on denser areas, where a single lawn sign
or volunteer has the potential to activate more support.154 That
said, cost arguments can still cut both ways. The media market
adjusts for density differences with price, but administration of
more media buys in several sparsely populated locales is a fixed
and unavoidable cost that candidates may want to avoid.155

B. Proportional Allocation
One approach to achieving more parity between electoral and
popular vote results without abolishing the Electoral College is
to allocate electors proportionally based on the popular vote in
each state. Forms of proportional allocation are used all over the
world to allocate legislative seats within borders.156 What makes
proportional representation systems attractive is that every
vote has an impact, irrespective of which candidate or option
receives the most votes.157 Though such a system would be
unusual for a single office, the Electoral College is itself a multi149 See Yard, supra note 147.
150 Bonnie Berkowitz & Shelly Tan, Think you’ll know who won on election night?
Not so fast., WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2018/politics/voting-quirks/.
151 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 449.
152 See id.
153 See supra note 109.
154 See Calderaro, supra note 102, at 302-05.
155 See Robb, supra note 2, at 457.
156 Lydia Miljan & Geoffrey Alchin, Proportional Representation in Practice: An
International Comparison of Ballots and Voting Rules, FRASER INST. (2018),
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/proportionalrepresentation-in-practice.pdf.
157 See Yard, supra note 147, at 212.
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member body and could be proportionally allocated in each
state based on the popular statewide result.

1. Methodology
Proportional allocation could be implemented through a
constitutional amendment or, much more plausibly, on a stateby-state basis. But many states may hesitate to implement
it out of concern that moving away from winner-takes-all
allocation will reduce their influence in presidential elections.
Additionally, lawmakers in traditionally red or blue states will
likely avoid using proportional allocation to ensure that their
respective parties’ presidential candidates do not lose electoral
votes they would receive under winner-takes-all allocation.
Accordingly, implementation of proportional allocation on
a state-by-state basis would require most states to agree to
switch to it at the same time. That way, no one state or political
party would clearly be sacrificing influence or support.
One way to implement proportional allocation would be
through an integral proportional system, wherein states would
allocate electors in rough proportion to the statewide popular
vote.158 Exactly how that allocation would work would depend
on the number of electors a state has, the number of candidates
running, and the rules the state sets for allocation.159
For example, a state with three electoral votes could choose to
round the share of popular vote to the nearest elector so that a
candidate receiving 53% of the popular vote would be entitled
to a share of 1.59 electoral votes, rounded to 2. This becomes
more complicated, however, if no candidate wins a majority—in
a scenario where two major party candidates receive 48%
and 46% of the vote, both are entitled to less than 1.5 electoral
votes, which rounds to 1 each. The state would need a provision
that allocates that third vote to one of the candidates—either a
third-party candidate receiving a marginal amount of the vote,
or (more likely) to the plurality winner.
This would not necessarily just be a problem in small states. In
2016, Arizona gave all 11 of its electors to Donald Trump after he
won an exceedingly narrow 48% to 45% victory in the state.160
Under strict proportional representation, he and Hillary Clinton
would have each received 5 electors (being entitled to less than
5.5 electoral votes). However, no single third-party candidate in

the state achieved the requisite 4.5% required to earn them at
least one rounded elector vote. As a result, the last vote would
have been unawarded without another rule to assign it.
In the 2016 election, 18 states would have had a single
unawarded elector using a strict integral proportional allocation,
and one state, Michigan, would have actually over-allocated
by one elector.161 This specific issue would become more
problematic if more marginal third-parties enter presidential
races. Third-party candidates could become more common as
a consequence of switching to proportional allocation, as they
would have a more plausible chance of accumulating electoral
votes.162 Accordingly, integral proportional allocation could not
be as simple as basic math and rounding.163
One workaround would be to adopt a perfect proportional
system. Decimals of electors could be awarded to candidates
in this system so their share of the electoral vote could track
precisely with the popular vote.164 However, this would create
its own difficulties. For one thing, such precise adherence to
popular vote share would put much more weight on the exact
accuracy of statewide vote totals, which are already frequently
subject to challenge and litigation in close elections.165
Moreover, this system would almost certainly require a
constitutional amendment to abolish the human element of the
Electoral College and give more flexibility to state legislatures.166
More importantly, however, states would not necessarily want
to allocate electors purely proportionally even if they adopted
these systems.167 They might opt to grant one or two extra
electors to the plurality winner in their state or grant extra
electors to any candidates who reach a certain threshold.168
To discourage third-party candidates, states might also set a
minimum vote percent for a candidate to receive any electors.169
At any rate, even nationwide adoption of proportional electoral
allocation would involve some degree of patchwork rules that
could be manipulated to partisan ends.170
161 See Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
162 David S. Wagner, The Forgotten Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in
Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot Initiatives to Effect That Change,
25 REV. LITIG. 575, 587 (2006).
163 See also Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
164 Vincy Fon, Electoral College Alternatives and US Presidential Elections, 12 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 41, 45 (2004).

158 See Vincy Fon, Integral Proportional System: Aligning Electoral Votes More
Closely with State Popular Votes, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 130 (2008).

165 See id.

159 See id.

167 See Fon, supra note 158, at 130.

160 Arizona Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2016/results/arizona.
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166 See id. at 45.

169 See Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
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2. Advantages
Much like other proposed reforms, proportional allocation
reduces the likelihood of a split between the popular and
electoral votes.171 However, it does so without dispensing with
the Electoral College system.172 Retaining the Electoral College
would appease groups who fear changing an otherwise stable
system and those who believe that smaller states should be
granted an electoral advantage.173 For reform advocates, it
also may be easier to garner support for an approach that still
improves conformance between the electoral and the popular
votes while preserving the Electoral College.174
Third parties are also likely to benefit from proportional
representation, where receiving just a small percentage of a
state’s vote could lead to winning electors.175 A proportional
system would significantly reduce the “spoiler effect” that
marginal third parties currently have in presidential races,
eliminating a major impediment to their candidacies.176 Though
only a substantial third-party could win the electoral majority
needed for the presidency, there could be other benefits for
third-parties to run credible candidates at the top of the ticket.
It could promote down-ballot third-party candidates and
a third-party’s public image. Such a change would likely be
popular too—surveys indicate that a majority of Americans
believe a third-party is needed,177 and many have argued that
a bipartisan system is a bad fit for a population as socially and
geographically diverse as that of the United States.178
Finally, a proportional system would make every vote count.
Non-plurality candidates would be awarded electors in
proportion to their popular support, and plurality candidates
would benefit from a larger margin of victory.179 It could also
emphasize to Americans that their votes choose electors rather
than the president, and that states have discretion over how
those votes are allocated. This is a poorly understood feature
171 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 457.
172 Id.

of presidential politics.180 Such an educative effect might help
people understand the system’s advantages and disadvantages
better and could spur other reform efforts.

3. Disadvantages
Though this method makes it likelier the electoral and popular
votes will align, it does not guarantee it.181 Small states would
still have outsize weight, and states would likely modify any
enacted proportional vote system to grant some electors on a
non-proportional basis.182 For example, if a proportional vote
system proposed in Pennsylvania in 2013 had been applied
nationally in 2016, it would have still awarded more electors
to Donald Trump than to Hillary Clinton due to its bias toward
plurality statewide winners.183
Moreover, proportional allocation systems are very susceptible
to triggering contingent elections where the House of
Representatives chooses the president and the Senate chooses
the vice president. As discussed, the Electoral College’s rules
mandate this procedure when no candidate receives a majority
of electoral votes. Contingent elections are more likely with
proportional allocation because it allows third parties to siphon
away the electoral votes needed for the major party candidates
to obtain a majority.184 This outcome would be hard to avoid
in a close contest—a proportional system that does not
privilege plurality winners would have sent the 2016 election to
Congress.185 Allowing Congress to select the president would
move the choice further from the people, effectively eliminating
one of the primary benefits of proportional allocation.
The higher complexity of proportional systems compared
to statewide winner-takes-all systems presents another
disadvantage. The rules for allocating electors mathematically
need some exceptions, and state legislatures would have wide
discretion to set those rules.186 This could decrease the public’s
understanding of the electoral process. A complicated system
that varies state-by-state would be more confusing to the
average American. It would also have downstream effects on

173 See Fon, supra note 158, at 129.
174 See id. at 130-31.
175 See Florey, supra note 7, at 358-59.
176 See id.
177 R.J. Reinhart, Majority in U.S. Still Say a Third-Party is Needed, GALLUP (Oct. 26,
2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/244094/majority-say-third-partyneeded.aspx.

180 Alex Vandermaas-Peeler et al., American Democracy in Crisis: The Challenges
of Voter Knowledge, Participation, and Polarization, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (July
17, 2018), https://www.prri.org/research/american-democracy-in-crisisvoters-midterms-trump-election-2018.
181 See Robb, supra note 2, at 451.
182 See id.

178 Mark Schmitt, Why America Should Have More Than 2 Political
Parties, VOX (Sept. 16, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/
polyarchy/2016/9/16/12934792/more-than-two-parties-good.

183 Gaming the Electoral College, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/
alternative-electoral-college-allocation-methods (last visited Apr. 23,
2018).
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186 See Wagner, supra note 162, at 586.
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campaigns strategizing to reach thresholds in certain states,
many outside of the traditional battlegrounds.187 There may
even be an interplay between campaigns and state legislatures,
which would have the ability to enact arbitrary rules that favor
their party’s candidate.188 All of this emphasizes simplicity in the
process as a virtue, and that moving from winner-take-all to a
more complex system would carry consequences.

C. Congressional District Method
Two states—Maine and Nebraska—have moved away from
winner-takes-all allocation in favor of the congressional district
method.189 Several states adopted this method or something
similar after the Constitutional Convention, when states were
more experimental with their elector allocation power.190 The
congressional district method puts a premium on geography
and gives a greater political voice to communities over a state
as a whole. It also disrupts the pernicious impacts of winnertakes-all in a less mathematically-cumbersome way than
proportional allocation.

1. Methodology
Like proportional allocation, the congressional district
method could be implemented either through constitutional
amendment or by individual states. States and political
parties may have concerns similar to those they would have
with proportional allocation—that implementing it absent
an agreement among many states to do so could result in a
reduction of influence for a state or support for candidates of
one of the parties.
Maine and Nebraska use very similar procedures to implement
the congressional district method. In both states, each
congressional district tabulates its own presidential vote
and awards a single electoral vote to their plurality winner.191
Additionally, a statewide vote is tabulated and the winner
receives the state’s two remaining electoral votes.192
This method makes it possible for a state to split its electoral
votes between candidates. In a state with two congressional
districts and two candidates for president, the districts could
award their electors to different candidates, resulting in a 3-1
split of electors in favor of the statewide vote winner. This is

what happened in Maine in 2016—Hillary Clinton was the
statewide winner and won Maine’s 1st District, while Donald
Trump won the 2nd District. Accordingly, Clinton won three
electoral votes to Trump’s one.193 Similarly, Barack Obama won
one congressional district in Nebraska district in 2008 while
losing the other districts and the statewide vote.194
It is possible in this system for a statewide plurality winner
to receive less than a plurality of electoral votes.195 This is
likeliest in states with many electors, where one candidate
obtains wide plurality margins in a few districts and the other
candidates obtains narrower plurality margins in the others.196
Electoral geography and partisan gerrymandering by Republican
state legislatures have made Democrats susceptible to this
problem since 2010.197 For this reason, Obama would have
lost re-election in 2012 despite winning a four-point national
popular vote majority if every state had used the congressional
district method.198 He also would have received less electoral
votes than his Republican opponent in several large states
despite commanding popular vote majorities in those states,
which included Florida, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Pennsylvania.199
Some find this unfair and believe legislatures should adopt
a rule ensuring that the statewide plurality winner obtains
a statewide electoral majority or electoral votes equaling
their plurality share of the vote.200 In such a scenario, Barack
Obama’s 2012 Electoral College margin would have been
reduced but still enough to win the presidency. Others believe
the electoral geography features of congressional district
method should be enhanced and that a state’s two additional
electors should be awarded to the candidate who wins the
greatest number of districts.201 This would give greater control
of a state’s elector allocation to its legislature when it redistricts.
193 Edward D. Murphy, Trump Takes 1 of Maine’s 4 Electoral Votes, in a First for
the State, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.pressherald.
com/2016/11/08/mainers-take-matters-into-their-own-hands-afterbitter-presidential-campaign/.
194 Jean Ortiz, Obama Wins 1 of Nebraska’s Electoral Votes, LINCOLN J. STAR (Nov.
13, 2008), https://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/obamawins-of-nebraska-s-electoral-votes/article_a5b75308-4ae0-58d8-9ba147e151b40604.html.
195 See Fon, supra note 158, at 132-33.
196 See id.
197 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 455.
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N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.
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200See Fon, supra note 164, at 54.
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Finally, though the congressional district method typically
uses congressional districts, states have devised alternative
methods for creating districts.202 In the Republic’s early years,
states experimented with special single-member and multimember districts exclusively drawn for presidential electors.203
Some used county and municipal boundaries to create electoral
districts.204 Maryland took an even more novel approach during
the first presidential election, holding a statewide election
but forcing a set number of electors to be chosen from its
eastern and western sides.205 Each method has its advantages
and drawbacks, but all demonstrate that it is essential to use
congressional districts with the district method.

2. Advantages
The congressional district method does much to improve on
the winner-takes-all system. Though less effective at mitigating
winner-takes-all than proportional allocation or a national
direct election, it creates a mechanism for voters to exercise
electoral power independent from the statewide plurality.206
Even the antidemocratic features of this method are arguably
less problematic than those of winner-takes-all—voters who are
not part of the statewide plurality might still propel their chosen
candidates to victory in their respective districts.207
The congressional district method also preserves the Electoral
College system and one of its key advantages: the lowered
stakes of the vote count.208 Both proportional allocation and a
direct national election rely on a single vote count and exact
vote margins.209 Election litigation and partisan interventions
into elections could increase quickly if specific vote margins
are more closely tied to the election’s outcome.210 The
congressional district method cabins these effects by limiting
the impact of any single vote to the district in which it is cast,
making only the most competitive districts subject to scrutiny.211

Given that districts will be on a spectrum of competitiveness,
candidates are likely to focus on voters in competitive districts
at the expense of others. However, the congressional district
method encourages candidates to focus on a more diverse
group of voters that cut across state lines.212 This would break
up the “swing states” in the winner-takes-all system and give
more constituencies the attention of presidential campaigns.213
It would also incentivize candidates to focus on swaying
moderate voters in competitive districts rather than energizing
their base to win a statewide election.214
Finally, the congressional district method is simple from both an
administrative and educational standpoint. Voters are familiar
with congressional districts and would understand how their
district’s vote impacts the broader election.215 States also have
already integrated district maps into their election procedure.216
Counting presidential votes within those boundaries would
likely require minimal changes to existing processes.

3. Disadvantages
Though it is an improvement over the winner-takes-all system,
the congressional district method still retains one of its most
pernicious elements: voters outside the plurality still have
no representation to pick the president.217 Because districts
cannot split their electors, plurality power merely shifts from
the statewide winner to the district winner.218 The congressional
district method is akin to a winner-takes-all system that
operates on a district level rather than a state level.219
Accordingly, candidates can still take advantage of narrow
majorities in enough places to win the election, albeit through
a more dispersed and numerous group of voting bodies.220 This
dynamic is fundamental to why Obama would have lost the
2012 election under a congressional district method system and
illustrates why it may be likelier to produce splits between the
popular and electoral votes in the modern era.
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congressional district method, since many states must draw majorityminority districts pursuant to the Voting Rights Act).
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Pulling congressional districts into the Electoral College would
also bring all of the attendant concerns about gerrymandering
and state legislative abuse of redistricting power into
presidential selection. Legislatures would become much
more powerful parties in deciding how their states allocate
presidential electors.221 Voters may question the legitimacy of
such a process, especially where district lines create substantial
deviance between the statewide vote and elector allocation.
Moreover, redistricting would itself become even more political
as legislators would have enormous incentive to draw maps
benefitting their parties in both presidential and congressional
elections.222 These maps would persist for a decade absent
judicial intervention. The public may demand redrawing of
the districts out of frustration with perceived corruption and
disempowerment by state governments.223 This same anger
could effectively nationalize the politics of state-level elections,
turning them into a proxy for national politics and distorting
otherwise independent state governance.224 However, a
compelling counterargument is that state legislatures may
have an incentive to create competitive districts to avoid public
discontent and incentivize candidate attention in their state.225

D. Ranked Choice Voting
Even without reform to the Electoral College or the way votes
are allocated, states have the power to marginally improve
their systems’ representativeness through voting reform. Firstpast-the-post systems amplify winner-takes-all unfairness by
awarding a state’s electors to a non-majority plurality winner in
a multi-candidate election.226 Most alternative voting systems
correct for this effect by incorporating voters’ next-choice
preferences or preference strength to identify a candidate with
majority support.227 Ranked choice voting is one of the more

221 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 454.

commonly implemented alternative voting systems and could
substantially improve the fairness of the Electoral College
system on the state level.

1. Methodology
Some foreign governments, municipal American governments
and one state have implemented ranked choice or instant
runoff voting, wherein voters rank candidates for an office
sequentially according to their preference.228 An initial count of
first preferences is tabulated after all votes are cast, and if no
candidate receives a majority, the lowest vote-getter is removed
and has her votes re-allocated to the other candidates based
on their voters’ second preferences.229 This process continues
until a candidate has secured a majority of the votes among the
remaining candidates.230
In a winner-takes-all system, this would mean that a candidate
would need an in-state majority to win a state’s electors.231
For example, if candidates A, B, and C are on the ballot in
Pennsylvania and they split the popular vote 45-35-20,
Candidate A would not necessarily receive Pennsylvania’s
20 electoral votes. The winner would be determined by the
second-choice preferences of Candidate C’s voters. If enough of
them supported Candidate B as their next-preferred option, she
would win Pennsylvania’s electors.
Some assume that ranked choice voting always selects a
candidate with the majority support of voters. This is not true.
Because voters are not required to rank every candidate on
the ballot, tabulation rounds exclude voters whose ranked
candidates have been eliminated.232 In the above example,
if the second preferences of candidate C’s voters split 70-10
between B and A, and 10% selected no second option, the new
tabulation would result in B receiving 51% of tabulated votes
and A receiving 49%. However, among all voters, B and A split
the vote 49-47, with 4% of voters choosing neither candidate.

222 See id.
223 Brett Neely & Sean McMinn, Voters Rejected Gerrymandering in 2018, but
Some Lawmakers Try to Hold Power, NPR (Dec. 28, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
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225 Lee Drutman, America Has Local Political Institutions But Nationalized Politics.
This is a Problem., VOX (May 31, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/
polyarchy/2018/5/31/17406590/local-national-political-institutionspolarization-federalism.
226 Florey, supra note 7, at 356-58.
227 See generally Renée Steinhagen, Giving New Jersey’s Minor Political Parties
a Chance: Permitting Alternative Voting Systems in Local Elections, N.J. LAW.,
August 2008, at 15, 17.

18

Presidents Must Be Elected Popularly

228 Edward B. Foley, Third-Party and Independent Presidential Candidates: The
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visited Apr. 23, 2019); see Yard, supra note 147, at 214.
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231 See Foley, supra note 228, at 1013-14 (showing how Al Gore would have
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Methods similar to ranked choice voting like the Condorcet
method avert this possibility.233 However, they are significantly
more complex and would present other challenges in both
enactment and implementation.234 Legislatures would also
need to consider rules for when voters have equal preferences
between candidates or when write-in candidacies get
substantial support.235 Maine is the only state to enact a ranked
choice system statewide and addresses both issues in its
election procedures.236

2. Advantages
Third-party and independent candidates benefit from ranked
choice voting because the spoiler effect is mitigated.237 Some
scholars argue that spoilers have had a very substantial impact
on American elections. In a 2016 article advocating for ranked
choice voting in presidential elections, Edward Foley identifies
at least six presidential elections where third-party candidates
changed the major party candidate who won the election.238
It might be argued that this was the case in the 2016 election,
where votes for third-party candidates outnumbered the vote
margin between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in several
key states.239
Ranked choice voting allows third-party candidates to run
without preventing their preferred major party candidate from
winning electors—unless, of course, the third-party candidate
is strong enough to win a statewide majority on their own.240
This gives a fair shot to more candidates and diversifies the
viewpoints represented on the national stage.241 This increase
in third-party activity could also have impacts on voter
participation and satisfaction, as more voters could support
a candidate with whom they strongly agree without forfeiting
their right to decide the presidency.242
233 See Foley, supra note 228, at 1018-19.
234 See id.
235 Ranked-choice Voting, ST. OF ME., https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/
upcoming/pdf/RCVFAQs.51618.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
236 Ella Nilsen, Maine Voters Blew up Their Voting System and Started
From Scratch, VOX (June 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.
com/2018/6/12/17448450/maine-ranked-choice-voting-paul-lepageinstant-runoff-2018-midterms.
237 See also Florey, supra note 7, at 358-59.
238 See generally Foley, supra note 228.
239 See Presidential Election Results, supra note 161.
240 See Yard, supra note 147, at 216-17.
241 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Runoff Voting Election Methodology, 67
A.L.R. 6TH 609 (2011).
242 See Yard, supra note 147, at 216.

Most importantly, ranked choice voting is an easily
implemented approach to making it likelier that the winner of a
statewide election commands a majority of popular support.243
Many other nations, recognizing the benefit of majority support,
require candidates for elected office to win a popular majority
and hold runoff elections between the top two vote-getters
when no candidate secures a majority in the first round of
voting.244 A key advantage of ranked choice over runoff systems
is that it does not limit the field of candidates to the top two
first-choices through its iterative process.245 It also avoids the
financial costs of a second election and avoids turnout issues in
subsequent and more consequential runoffs.246

3. Disadvantages
While ranked choice voting corrects the anti-majoritarian
spoiler effect, its key disadvantage is that it leaves alone and
even enhances other problems in the Electoral College system.
The risk of a split between the popular and electoral votes is
still present as long as the winner-takes-all system is in place.247
Though ranked choice voting would have likely prevented the
popular-electoral splits in 2000 and 2016, other presidential
elections may have been thrown to a popular vote loser.248
Additionally, if ranked choice voting caused an emergence of
third parties, the possibility of contingent elections would be
increased. A contingent election would occur where a thirdparty candidate won enough states to deprive a major party
candidate of a majority of electoral votes, but not enough states
to form their own majority.249 Resolving such hotly contested
elections by a nondemocratic and highly partisan process as
contingent elections would jeopardize the legitimacy of the
nation’s election process, as highlighted in Part II.250 However,
these circumstances might create public momentum for greater
reform.251 Likewise, a third-party candidate could bargain with
major party candidates and instruct their electors to vote for
them instead, avoiding the contingent process.252
243 See Zitter, supra note 241.
244 See Yard, supra note 147, at 217-18.
245 See Zitter, supra note 241.
246 See Yard, supra note 147, at 216-17.
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Finally, there are some indications that ranked choice voting
is not a good fit for the voting public. Critics allege that it is
more complicated than first-past-the-post, and that it has
been repealed in some jurisdictions in favor of reverting to
traditional systems.253 The empirical evidence on both points
is mixed. Some jurisdictions implementing ranked choice have

seen ballot invalidation rates about equal to first-past-the-post
elections, while others have seen much higher rates.254 Likewise,
more racially or politically diverse candidates being elected
has often precipitated ranked choice voting repeal, suggesting
these efforts are motivated more by powerful interests than
dissatisfaction with the process.255

253 See Liam Sigaud, Thanks to Ranked-Choice Voting, Expect a Spike in
Spoiled Ballots, MAINE WIRE (May 17, 2018), https://www.themainewire.
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https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/amid-heated-sf-mayor-contestpressure-mounts-to-repeal-ranked-choice-voting/.

254 Drew Penrose, Ranking is Easy—A Response to Misleading Claims About
Voter Errors, FAIRVOTE (May 21, 2018), https://www.fairvote.org/ranking_is_
easy_a_response_to_misleading_claims_about_voter_error.

20

Presidents Must Be Elected Popularly

255 Andrew Spencer et al., Escaping the Thicket: The Ranked Choice Voting
Solution to America’s Districting Crisis, 46 CUMB. L. REV. 377, 410-14 (2016).

IV. Our Recommendation: Nationalize the Vote, Restore
the College, and Give the People a Meaningful Choice
Proportional allocation and the congressional district method
both aim to make the better of a difficult situation. They
preserve the Electoral College framework while bringing it more
in line with popular democracy by lessening the problems of
winner-takes-all. Even if one believes the Electoral College
should not be abolished, proportional allocation and the
congressional district method are better alternatives than the
system we have today. Although popular-electoral splits are still
possible under these systems, they more effectively implement
the values that many use to argue for the Electoral College,
namely empowering small states and representing the nation’s
diverse electoral geography.
These values are manifested elsewhere in our electoral system
as well: equal voting power in the Senate was expressly
designed to protect smaller states and geographic communities
were meant to be elevated in the House. One could argue
that making elector apportionment equal to congressional
representation indicates these values were meant to be
preserved in presidential selection. We cannot know this for
sure. What we do know is that the framers did not view electors
as bound to vote for any candidate.256 They desired electors
who would deliberate and select a candidate with care, much in
the way they resolved difficult questions at the Convention.257
This check between the people and the president was borne out
of fear that Congress or the public would select a leader who
was not fit for the presidency.258 This is the paramount value
embodied by the Electoral College. It is a safeguard designed
to protect the Republic from itself by handing selection of the
president, in some sense, to nobility. The framers created a
body in their own image—appointed by states, comprised of the
elite—to have a final say on who would be president.
But the Electoral College practically never functioned in this
manner. The norms around how the nation chooses the
president have evolved to make it unimaginable that a small
group of elite citizens would deliberate to choose the president.
Such a group would be fundamentally anti-democratic. No
other democracy uses such a body. Accordingly, we propose
abolishing the Electoral College system as it exists in favor of
a direct national election winnable by a simple majority. We
also implore the states to use ranked-choice voting to ensure
candidates achieve majority support.

Without a realistic path to a constitutional amendment,
we endorse the effort to implement direct popular election
via interstate compact and encourage states to adopt the
NPVIC. States should also implement ranked-choice voting
and stipulate that the iterative process will identify a majority
winner using ballots from states employing it. Though there are
clear obstacles to its adoption, we believe the NPVIC represents
the best and most practical effort to improve the way the nation
chooses the president.
States use the winner-takes-all system because the Electoral
College incentivizes it. As discussed, an individual state’s
incentive is to maximize its impact on the total by awarding
all electors to the winner, and solidly partisan states have an
incentive to award as many of their electors as possible to their
statewide winner.259 These effects are enhanced for every other
state that chooses to use winner-takes-all.260 In that way, an
unspoken sort of compact already exists between the states,
with deviance punished by devaluation in presidential selection
and costs for a state’s presidential preference.261
Accordingly, all the states must act in concert to amend it.
Absent a constitutional amendment, there is no practical path
to meaningful Electoral College reform on a state-by-state basis
aside from a compact.
We recognize that the NPVIC has attracted solely partisan
support and that support by only one of the political parties will
likely be insufficient to gain implementation in states holding a
majority of the electoral votes. However, we do not accept the
premise that electoral reform is necessarily a partisan issue. That
Democratic presidential candidates lost the two most recent
races where there was a split between the popular and electoral
votes does not mean that a Republican candidate could not lose
a future election in the same manner. This would shift the politics
of reform dramatically. If more states continue to sign onto the
NPVIC and it gets closer to an electoral majority necessary,
conversation about electoral reform will follow and force reluctant
politicians on both sides of the aisle to defend the deeply
unpopular proposition of keeping the Electoral College unchanged.
There are valid questions regarding the compact’s
constitutionality. The Constitution’s Interstate Compact Clause
may require that NPVIC receive congressional approval.262
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259 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 448.

257 See id.

260 See Robb, supra note 2, at 462.

258 See Hooks, supra note 140, at 206-07.

261 See id.
262 See Amar, supra note 114, at 252.
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It is important for members of the public to understand this
issue and lobby Congress to approve the compact. Similarly,
members of the public in states that have not approved the
compact should lobby their representatives to support it. Even
if the NPVIC is not adopted by enough states or is struck down
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on constitutional grounds, we believe public momentum should
be brought to bear on Electoral College reform, and that more
avenues for reform will open up if this one is pursued to its
endpoint.

Conclusion
The NPVIC represents the most promising and meaningful
reform effort in a generation. We urge those invested in
Electoral College reform to commit to supporting it and
continue the important work of truly democratizing American
presidential elections.
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